Cod in Newfoundland and Lofoten, two stories an ocean apart

The collapse of cod stocks in Newfoundland

Newfoundland, a gigantic concentration of codfish

Initially, Newfoundland’s marine expanses were home to the world’s largest concentration of cod. Exploited since the 16th century by European fishermen, then by Canadians, catches grew steadily until they reached around 500,000 tonnes in 1950. This activity largely structured life on Canada’s east coast, and contributed to the activity of many European fishing ports.

At the end of the 1950s, the replacement of traditional fishing techniques by trawlers initially led to a massive increase in catches: the maximum catch was 810,000 tonnes in 1968. ² . Catch levels then fell drastically over the 1970s.

In the late 1970s, Canada extended its maritime jurisdiction from 12 to 200 nautical miles. ³ with the intention of bringing a large part of the cod stocks under its control. It declared its intention to limit the volume of catches to around 20% of these stocks, in order to allow them to recover. This was apparently successful, as in 1988, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) reported that cod numbers had quintupled since 1976. Catches then increased again.

Newfoundland: report after report until collapse

But inshore fishermen had generally not adapted their technologies, and were seeing a decline in their catches. Their protests led to the Keats report 4 report, which stated in 1986 that the actual catch was in fact between 30% and 60% of stocks. This was followed by an official inquiry, which led to the Alverson report ⁵ prepared by fisheries specialists. This report stated that the stock had been increasing since 1977, albeit very slowly after 1982. It also asserted that the catch rate was in fact above the 20% authorized by the government, but curiously, its summary note established that the catch calculations made by DFO were well within the range of estimates supported by available data.

DFO concluded that the differences between its figures and those of the Alverson team were not significant. But the Alverson team’s new assessment in 1989 concluded that the stock was not increasing, and recommended a reduction in offshore catches by almost half. Offshore fishermen complained that there was no evidence of stock decline.

The controversy continued, and a new independent DFO investigation was commissioned: the Harris Report. ⁶ report confirmed in 1990 that catches were probably double the target, and that the stock was just over half of what DFO claimed. Harris claimed that the level of exploitation was such that the extinction of the commercial fishery was foreseeable, which caused a media sensation, and prescribed a reduction in catches from 235,000 tonnes in 1989 to 125,000 tonnes in 1990. In practice, a limit of 190,000 tonnes was applied from 1990 to 1992. The economic and social consequences began to be felt: in 1992, it became clear that there was little left to catch, and an emergency moratorium was imposed in July 1992. However, the stock did not recover, and it was not until 1999 that an inshore fishery of 9,000 tonnes was again authorized. The economic consequences of this crisis amounted to billions of Canadian dollars during the 1990s: lost sales, unemployment compensation and financial aid.

The human factors of failure

The remarkable thing about the decline in Newfoundland cod stocks and removals is that the attention of scientists, the state and public opinion to prudent management of the resource was not absent from the story. According to a sociological survey published in 1994 ⁷ DFO scientists warned early on about the shortcomings of Canadian management, but failed to make themselves heard. In short, politicians relied on scientific uncertainties to facilitate short-term conflict resolution. The scientists, for their part, could not be sufficiently assertive, given their imperfect understanding of the ocean ecosystem and the technical and environmental challenges associated with observation techniques. All this is obviously exacerbated in a cultural and social context where cod fishing was a source of social and cultural identity and represented the livelihood of many families.

Another place, another story: Lofoten cod

The Lofoten archipelago in northern Norway has had a much happier fate for cod fishing, even though cod concentrations fell sharply in the 1980s. Here too, cod fishing – also known as Atlantic cod fishing – has fed mankind for hundreds of years, and even longer, since it was already practiced by the Vikings in the Barents Sea.

In the 1980s, catches declined, but the alarm was heard in time. In the spring of 1989, the joint Russian-Norwegian commission in charge of cod stock management closed the fishery to avoid decimating a dying fish population. Immediately, a program was implemented to save the cod and its fishermen. This included strict quotas, a revised minimum catch size and a ban on discards. All of these measures were strictly controlled by the authorities, with surprise visits by the coastguard, a tonnage-tracking system and very severe penalties for offenders. The fishermen and their union representatives were initially opposed to this, but soon realized that the risk – if they failed to do so – was to lose everything, as had happened in Newfoundland. The situation has been very difficult for the sector: because of the quotas imposed, the number of fishermen has been halved in just over twenty years.

These efforts have been amply rewarded, with the number of fishermen now on the rise again. Over the last ten years or so, cod stocks have rebuilt before exploding. The national quota quintupled between 1990 and 2015, and the cod stock has tripled since the 1980s. And still in 2015, the Russian-Norwegian Commission granted 425,000 tonnes of catch to Scandinavian fishermen alone. An entire industry has been redeveloped, benefiting the economic life of the sector and the country as a whole.

In conclusion

In Lofoten, the disaster scenario of the Newfoundland fisheries was avoided thanks to the responsiveness of the authorities responsible for managing fish stocks, and a considerable effort on the part of the fishermen and the region as a whole. Although the local population suffered for some twenty years as a result of the restrictive measures, it is clear in retrospect that the measures taken were the only way to restore a healthy ecological balance, and hence the prosperity of the fishing industry.

A comparison of the two situations reveals a number of lessons.

• Sound ecological management of natural resources is essential, even when they are renewable. In this case, a fish population that had been exploited at high levels for centuries in Newfoundland has disappeared due to excessive fishing pressure, whereas prudent management could have ensured its continued exploitation.
• We need to act quickly when the first signs of resource decline appear, because they may herald an even more profound deregulation of the ecosystems that support it.
• What is in the best interest of the individual is not always in the best interest of society as a whole. Open access, maximizing individual profit, can lead to collective ruin.
• Strong, decisive intervention by the State, or by a collective organized around the common resource, is essential to manage stocks of renewable resources, particularly but not only in times of crisis.
• When it comes to managing natural resources, medium-term sacrifices are sometimes strictly necessary to get back on the road to prosperity.
• Under the precautionary principle, the most extreme scientific hypotheses must be taken into account when endeavoring to rectify a situation of peril, and not just average hypotheses.